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I. INTRODUCTION
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice1 intelligently addresses
difficult issues at the intersection of medical ethics and the theory of
justice. The authors Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels,
and Daniel Wikler repeatedly emphasized their opinion that advances in
genetic technology force upon us entirely new ethical questions that
previous moral theories lack the resources to resolve.2 The claim that
*
1.
(2000).
2.

Professor, University of California San Diego.
ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS

AND JUSTICE

The authors pointed to “another set of distributive justice issues raised by rapid
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new scientific discoveries render previous moral theories obsolete
should be regarded with suspicion. Suspicion should be further aroused
when readers note another feature of the authors’ theorizing that neatly
fits the claim that we stand at the dawn of a new world of ethical
theorizing. The authors’ discussion from start to finish stayed at a
middle level. That is, the authors began each chapter with a few moral
principles taken to be plausible or possibly plausible and examined their
implications for issues raised by new genetic technology.3 This is not an
exercise in applied ethics, because the principles initially invoked are
subjected to criticism and scrutiny. But in almost every significant case,
the results are inconclusive. The moral puzzles that are raised are left
unsolved, with moral reasons pointing towards opposed conclusions and
the principles that generated these opposed reasons left in an unordered
state, with no guidance as to how much relative weight to assign to one
or another of these principles. The authors endorsed Rawlsian reflective
equilibrium methodology4 in ethics, but tentative reflective equilibrium5
tends to remain beyond reach in the chapters of this book.
These results might be thought to justify the conclusion that the
problems we now face require new age theories not yet constructed.
advances in genetic science that have not even been systematically articulated, much less
resolved.” Id. at 62–63. The authors also stated that “as the possibilities of what may be
called radical genetic intervention come closer to realization, the most fundamental
single framing assumption of our ordinary ways of thinking about justice, both in theory
and in practice, will be shattered.” Id. at 84–85.
3. For example, chapters 3 and 4 discuss interpretations of equality of opportunity
in the light of genetic advances. Id. at 61–154. Chapter 5 discusses possible moral
limits on would-be parents’ freedom to use genetic science interventions to enhance their
children’s traits that are posed by equality of opportunity and the child’s right to an open
future. Id. at 156–203. Chapter 6 discusses how properly to balance reproductive
freedom and the duty not to cause harm to those who do not voluntarily consent to bear
the risks and costs of one’s actions. Id. at 204–57. Summarizing their approach, the
authors stated that they did not “offer a comprehensive theory,” but instead deployed
several “broad principles” including equality of opportunity, the prevention of harm,
individual freedom, citizenship and political participation, and inclusion in society. Id. at
308–09.
4. The authors noted that they employed the method of wide reflective
equilibrium. Id. at 371. The method is drawn from John Rawls. JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 40–46 (rev. ed. 1999). Using this method, one tests proposed
particular moral claims by seeking to identify acceptable moral principles that imply
them, and one tests proposed moral principles by checking to see if the particular moral
claims they would imply are acceptable. In reflective equilibrium, one embraces general
moral principles and particular moral claims that are mutually consistent and that strike
one as plausible after reflection. Wide reflective equilibrium is that state of reflective
equilibrium one would reach after ideally extended and rationally conducted moral
reflection.
5. As used in this Essay, a tentative or provisional reflective equilibrium means to
refer to the outcome of an ethical discussion in which all considerations presented are
accounted for and all particular moral claims defended are implied by moral principles
that the discussion has found no good reason to reject.
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However, this conclusion would be premature. Another possibility is
that when middle level theorizing yields no decisive results, we need to
shift the discussion back to first principles. Issues that appear intractable
when viewed through unordered midlevel principles may be resolvable
when we step back to the level of fundamental moral principles.
One should also notice the possibility that quite independently of
scenarios suggested by the development of new genetic technologies, our
current understanding of morality at the fundamental level is quite shaky.
Different kinds of problems pull our intuitions in different directions,
and no set of moral principles currently available provides a stable and
intuitively acceptable reconciliation of these conflicting ethical tugs and
pulls. If this is our actual situation, then a finding that current ethical
theory cannot resolve in a satisfactory way some problem brought up by
new genetic technologies should not lead us to the trumpet call that we
are witnessing the dawn of a revolutionary new age. What we are
witnessing is business as usual.
This Essay argues that From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice
exhibits both of the possible flaws just mentioned. In some cases the
authors discussed midlevel principles and took the inability of these
principles to resolve some problem in medical ethics as evidence that
the problem is, for now, intractable. However, if one looks for a more
fundamental level principle adequate to resolve this impasse, one is
ready at hand, and its deftness in rendering the tractable intractable
provides evidence that this candidate fundamental level principle
deserves to be taken seriously. In other cases the authors presented new
genetic technologies as posing entirely new puzzles that current theories
are inadequate to resolve. Upon examination, however, it turns out that
the new problems, though genuinely perplexing for current theory, are
versions of problems that have always been with us and have always
been perplexing. In one case, while discussing equality of opportunity,
the authors upheld a principle that I shall argue is plagued with
difficulties that warrant its rejection.6

6. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 16. One should note that the authors stated
in the preface that they disagree among themselves to some extent “regarding some
aspects of the theory of just health care and the place of equality of opportunity in a
comprehensive theory of justice.” Id. at xiii–xiv. They pointed out that Allen Buchanan
was the primary author of chapters 3 and 7 while Norman Daniels authored chapter 4. Id.
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II. DO GENETIC TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES REQUIRE RETHINKING
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE?
A notable attractive feature of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and
Justice is its extended discussion of the implications for the theory of
justice of puzzle cases suggested by advances in genetic technology.
These discussions proceed at an admirable level of clarity and rigor.
However, I discern a tendency to exaggerate the extent to which the
puzzles suggested by these medical advances really require rewriting the
book on social justice.
The authors asserted that several contemporary theories of distributive
justice start their discussions by postulating a world of individuals
differing in native talents, and, more generally, in native dispositions to
develop prudentially desirable and undesirable traits.7 The individuals
also differ in childhood social environments that they experience. In
these discussions a set of institutions and practices is implicitly
presupposed, so that individuals as described face unequal life prospects
at the onset of adulthood. The question for social justice then becomes
what compensation, if any, is morally required to improve the life
prospects of worse-off individuals. The authors then stated that this
framework comes unhinged if we add the possibility that medical
interventions after birth can alter an individual’s genes and hence her
tendency to develop certain traits.8 Rather than compensate individuals
for lack of natural talent, one perhaps should intervene to alter genes and
equalize talents across individuals. The expanded possibilities for
interventions to improve individuals’ traits that genetic science advances
might bring would expand the requirements of some egalitarian
conceptions of distributive justice in radical and perhaps disturbing
ways.
But why would the possibility of administering gene therapy with a
view to altering someone’s traits to improve her life prospects differ in
principle from the familiar possibility of administering an education
regime or a socialization regime with a view to altering someone’s
traits to improve her life prospects? A society might intervene to make
an individual’s social environment more conducive to individual
development, boosting the individual’s life prospects. This might occur
by way of instituting public health programs such as vaccination,
maintaining state-run public schools free to students, establishing public
playgrounds, and monitoring parents and guardians to enforce a
7.
8.
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sufficient level of parental nurturing and prevention of child abuse.
Providing genetic therapy would be just one more tool in society’s tool
kit to be deployed to improve individuals’ life prospects according to
principles of distributive justice.
The authors noted another possibility, one that has to some extent
already become actual.9 In a world in which genetic testing of fetuses
becomes more sophisticated, potential parents can decide whether to
bring to term a fetus that is diagnosed as having a condition deemed
undesirable. One can envisage the development of medical technologies
that enable intervention before or after conception to affect the genetic
qualities of what will become new persons. The social justice issues
then become, one might think, utterly transformed, from what we owe to
given people to improve their life prospects to what sort of people
should we bring into being.10 But of course the new issue is familiar in
broad outline. It has been common knowledge for a very long time that
if a smart person marries another smart person, the two are more likely
to give birth to a smart child than would have been the case had the
smart person married the village idiot. Assortative mating raises the
moral issue of what sort of people we should bring into being. But I
acknowledge that increasing genetic knowledge renders salient certain
extreme possibilities that can put strain on existing distributive justice
categories, much as the development of nuclear weapons might be
thought to pose a new challenge for traditional just war theory. This is
not to deny that increasing scientific knowledge could radically
undermine the basis of a moral theory—in fact, modern science
decisively threatens traditional and deep-seated notions of agency and
responsibility and free will.11 However, the genetic technology
scenarios presented by the authors do not remotely correspond to this
deep conceptual paradox production.
III. TOWARD PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATE FUNDAMENTAL
MORAL PRINCIPLES
In chapters 3 and 4, the authors addressed difficult issues of
distributive justice as they emerge in the context of health care policy
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 84–86; see also id. at 204–57.
For a fine recent treatment of this topic, see DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING
WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001).
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issues.12 Before considering their discussion of these matters, this Essay
sketches an approach to social justice that is plausible and may be
worthy of further examination.
Perhaps the most fundamental idea in this package is found in
Amartya Sen’s writings on social justice.13 Sen noted that people’s
individual characteristics vary, so that different individuals are unequally
able to transform resources into goal fulfillment or well-being for
themselves and others.14
If the imperative of social justice is to help enable people who are
disadvantaged to lead better lives, then the basis of interpersonal
comparison for the theory of justice should be the quality of life that
given resources in a particular environment enable an individual to
reach. One’s resource or primary social goods holdings can only be a
rough indicator, not the ultimate social justice concern. Here, the term
“quality of life” refers to the individual’s objective level of well-being,
not her preference satisfaction level or happiness. We all want to
achieve lives of value, not merely to satisfy our preferences, which
might be confused or otherwise misdirected. Happiness, the experience
of pleasure, or more broadly, a subjective sense of well-being, is a
component of the good life, not the whole of it. In short, the currency of
justice should be well-being.15
The authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice asserted
a claim that could reasonably be regarded as a significant objection
against taking well-being to be the basis of interpersonal comparison for
the theory of justice: citizens in modern democracies disagree about
what constitutes human good.16 The wide diversity of religious belief in
democratic societies indicates the depth and breadth of this
disagreement. The claim that is supposed to follow is that some version
of a resource-oriented theory of justice must be correct, because no
welfarist alternative could elicit the reasoned agreement of all citizens.
However, this thought eliminates objective well-being as the basis of
interpersonal comparison for justice purposes only by invoking a
skepticism about prospects of reasoned ethical agreement that would
12. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 61–155.
13. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) (explicating the complex
notion of equality of condition and explaining its place in theories of justice).
14. Id. at 19–21, 79–87.
15. Sen himself is cautious about drawing the inference his arguments may
warrant, that the currency of justice (the standard of interpersonal comparison employed
in fundamental social justice principles) should be an objective standard of utility or
well-being. For a discussion of this issue, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 29–54 (1999). See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 11–115 (2000).
16. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 80–81.
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shrivel the theory of justice if it were applied evenhandedly across the
concepts of the good and the right.
Setting aside such skepticism, reflective equilibrium methods in ethics
can generate stable agreement regarding both the good and the right.
Much actual disagreement about the good is rooted in ignorance,
confusion, superstition, and bad reasoning. But a just society that
provides people fair shares of opportunity to lead genuinely good lives is
not somehow rendered unjust or morally illegitimate by the fact that
some citizens regard themselves as unfairly treated or having
inadequate opportunity for the good because they have incorrect
beliefs about the nature of human good. One should also be prepared
to accept partial commensurability—some goods and ways of life may
be indeterminately choice worthy, neither better nor worse than each
other nor exactly as good as each other.
What constitute fair shares of opportunity for well-being? Some
propose a norm of equal distribution.17 The approach favored in this
Essay does not regard everyone’s having the same as morally valuable,
much less that it is a requirement of justice for everyone to have the
same. The imperative of morality, and of justice as the social arm of
morality, is to bring about improvement in the quality of people’s lives,
with priority given to boosting the well-being of those whose prospects
for well-being would otherwise be poor.
This is the doctrine known as the priority view or prioritarianism.18 It
says that acts and policies should be chosen to maximize moral value,
this being a function of well-being and its distribution.19 The moral
value of obtaining a well-being gain (avoiding a loss) for an individual is
greater, the greater the well-being gain the benefit achieves, and greater,
the lower the person’s lifetime well-being expectation before receipt of
the benefit. This characterization identifies a family of principles; a
17. For a defense of equality of condition, see LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993).
Temkin also defends equality against priority. Id. at 245–82.
18. For the first published discussions on the priority view, see Paul Weirich,
Utility Tempered with Equality, 17 NOÛS 423 (1983); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE
REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 31 (rev. ed. 1994). For a thorough exposition, see
DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OR PRIORITY? (1995). See also Dennis McKerlie, Equality and
Priority, 6 UTILITAS 25 (1994).
19. More generally, the prioritarian holds that it is more valuable to bring about a
benefit (or avoid a loss) for someone the worse their condition. This Essay ties the
priority view to a particular claim about how to assess someone’s condition as better or
worse. Well-being refers to whatever makes a person’s life intrinsically better for that
very person.
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specific principle is obtained by specifying how much extra moral value
accrues from provision of gains to the badly off.
Prioritarianism as so far characterized is well defined only for decision
problems in which the number of individuals who will exist can be
regarded as fixed. This Essay will not try to formulate a version of the
principle for variable population.20
The question arises whether what we owe to an individual by way of
boosts to her well-being varies depending on her exercise of
responsibility. This might be done by stipulating that what we owe to
one another is the provision of prioritarian shares of opportunity for
well-being rather than any guarantee of any level of well-being itself. It
might be done in other ways. I favor responsibility-catering versions of
prioritarianism, but this Essay, for the most part, ignores this issue.21
This Essay alternates between formulating prioritarianism as requiring
provision of opportunities for well-being and as requiring provision of
well-being.
IV. THE MORALITY OF INCLUSION: PUZZLES AND A SOLUTION
The authors posed as an unsolved puzzle for morality the issue of
inclusion of disabled people into schemes of cooperation.22 They began
with the observation, first made by Daniel Wikler in 1979, that whether
an individual with given traits qualifies as able in the normal way or
disabled depends on the matching between the individual’s traits and the
20. One promising proposed principle that fixes what should be done when
population is variable is critical-level utilitarianism. This view holds that adding a
person to the world is not per se morally valuable unless the person has lifetime utility
(well-being) above some critical level. The critical-level idea can be joined to the
priority view. See generally Charles Blackorby et al., Critical-Level Utilitarianism and
the Population-Ethics Dilemma, 13 ECON. & PHIL. 197 (1997).
21. For more on this issue, see Richard J. Arneson, Rawls, Responsibility, and
Distributive Justice, in JUSTICE, UTILITY, AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM: THEMES FROM
HARSANYI AND RAWLS (Maurice Salles & John Weymark eds., forthcoming) (arguing
that integrating a sensible account of personal responsibility into the theory of justice
requires rejecting Rawls’s views). See also Richard J. Arneson, Egalitarianism and
Responsibility, 3 J. ETHICS 225 (1999) (urging that plausible judgments about when and
why we should aid those who are worse off are better explained and justified by the
priority view than by rival principles of equality or sufficiency); Richard J. Arneson,
Equal Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 488 (1999)
(arguing that principles of justice should be prioritarian not egalitarian, responsibility
catering, and welfarist); Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism,
110 ETHICS 339 (2000) (arguing that personal responsibility as reflected in the
distinction between brute luck and option luck should be incorporated in fundamental
moral principles, which should be prioritarian); Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should Be
the Currency of Justice, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 497 (2000) (arguing that the measure of
people’s condition for the theory of distributive justice should be well-being objectively
understood).
22. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 20–21, 95–99, 258–303.
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going schemes of cooperation.23 They added that the set-up of these
cooperative schemes is a human contrivance and one that can be altered
by deliberate policy.24 The issue then becomes what limits justice places
on the morally permissible constitution of cooperative schemes, given
that any choice of scheme includes some and perhaps excludes some.
The authors focussed on the latent or explicit choice of a dominant
scheme of social cooperation, set by the entry requirements for full
participation in the market economy and the governmental process and
the educational system and similar large institutional schemes.25
The authors set up the issue nicely but left it unresolved. One is left
with conflicting considerations pulling in opposite directions, with no
guideline for reconciling them. On the one side, people with diminished
capacities have a legitimate interest in being able to participate fully in
the dominant scheme of social cooperation, which would assure them a
status of basic equality and reciprocity. Justice inclines toward the
imperative of revising and opening the dominant scheme of social
cooperation to render it ever more inclusive of as many marginal
participants as possible. But justice is pulled from the other side as well.
The countervailing tug is what the authors called the “maximizing
interest” and explained in these words: “Each individual has an
important and morally legitimate interest in having access to a
cooperative scheme that is the most productive and rewarding form of
interaction in which he or she can participate effectively.”26 Beyond
emphasizing the significant justice reasons that urge us to give full
measure to the claims of the morality of inclusion, the authors did not
offer a proposal for balancing the conflicting considerations that they
adduced.27
The authors did claim that identifying the problem of the morality of
inclusion is itself a novel achievement. Of the conflict between the
interest in widening access to the dominant cooperative scheme and in
making that scheme maximally productive, they wrote: “Theorists of
23. Id. at 285–86; Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 377, 386–89 (1979).
24. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 284–87.
25. Id. at 20, 258–60, 288–91.
26. Id. at 291–92.
27. But see the authors’ interesting discussion. Id. at 301–02. Here the authors
tentatively suggested that there might be a strong moral requirement, as a first priority, to
bring as many individuals as possible to a threshold level of participation that is good
enough. Id. Beyond that threshold, the maximizing interest has more weight.
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justice have not only failed to supply a principled account of how these
conflicting interests ought to be balanced; they have almost without
exception failed to identify the problem as one of justice.”28 Benighted
theorists of justice have assumed the problem of justice to be a fair
division of the benefits of social cooperation. But the prior and more
fundamental problem, identified by the authors, is the choice of a
framework of social cooperation.
However, the problem as characterized by the authors is not new, and
there are already available theories of justice that address it.
A. Not New
All human societies have contained disabled and partially disabled
individuals, more generally individuals with varying abilities. Any
theory of justice that supposes that better-off individuals have some
moral obligation founded on justice to aid worse-off individuals will
generate an account of what is owed to the disabled, so long as the
theory countenances disability as a form or component of being worse
off. The account of what is owed to the disabled will fall out from the
account of what is owed to those who are badly off, disadvantaged. One
might get a contrary impression from reading John Rawls’s famous A
Theory of Justice, but Rawls did not ignore or overlook the problem of
disability. He explicitly assumed it away, along with all serious
accidents and disease, by assuming that all members of society are able
to be fully contributing participants over their entire lives.29 This move
is a simplifying assumption, made so he could concentrate his analytical
attention on the problems his account highlights. In the wake of his
book, other theorists of justice have relaxed this simplifying
assumption.30
B. Already Available Theories of Justice Address the Issue
This problem is one that is very plausibly treated by the prioritarian
principle. The plausibility of the prioritarian approach to the problem is
28. Id. at 293.
29. Rawls’s most explicit discussion of this aspect of A Theory of Justice occurs in
his later book. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 183–85 (1993). Rawls wrote: “I
have assumed throughout, and shall continue to assume, that while citizens do not have
equal capacities, they do have, at least to the essential minimum degree, the moral,
intellectual, and physical capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating members of
society over a complete life.” Id. at 183.
30. For example, see SEN, supra note 13. See also NORMAN DANIELS, JUST
HEALTH CARE 1–56 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000).
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interesting in its own right and indicates that prioritarianism itself merits
serious scrutiny.
Recall that the prioritarian view is that social arrangements should be
set and actions chosen to maximize weighted well-being. The lower an
individual’s lifetime well-being, the greater the value of increasing it.
Disability tends to lower well-being prospects. Other things being
equal, one has higher life prospects if one has normal eyesight than if
one is blind. So other things being equal, the prioritarian has a reason to
channel resources toward the disabled, in so far as disability status
correlates with low well-being.
Disability sometimes has another effect. Being disabled can reduce the
amount of well-being gain that one is enabled to achieve by a given
infusion of resources, compared to what an able person could get with the
same resource infusion. For example, if an individual is blind, deaf,
legless, and in chronic pain, that person’s well-being may well be very
low even if enormous resources are expended on him, and even though his
well-being always increases a little with each increment of aid. At some
point, these two effects will balance, so that bringing it about that the
conditions of his life improve further gains less weighted well-being than
would using these same resources to bring about improvements in the
conditions of people who are already relatively better off in well-being.
Prioritarianism registers the common sense judgment that able people
owe some moral consideration to the disabled, and have some significant
responsibility for improving their lives. But this responsibility is limited,
because at some point the gains from further aid to the disabled are
morally outweighed by the greater moral value that would accrue if the
aid is channeled elsewhere. The priority view clarifies the nature of this
trade-off and uses a sensible yardstick for measuring gains and losses to
people from alternate social arrangements.
This sensible yardstick claim has been challenged.31 Consider Tiny
Tim, the cheerful cripple in Charles Dickens’s story A Christmas Carol.
He is immensely cheerful and is perhaps happier than the average
person. According to prioritarianism, the judgment that some special
consideration is owed to the disabled depends on the factual claim that
having a disability makes one worse off. But, the argument goes, at this
point prioritarianism diverges from common sense judgment. The latter
31. See G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 917–
21 (1989).
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holds that what we owe to the disabled does not vary with any estimate
of their overall well-being prospects—a happy Tiny Tim is no less
deserving of a motorized wheelchair.
C. In Reply
The Tiny Tim example illustrates the importance of understanding
well-being as access to the full range of genuinely important human
goods and not merely as having subjectively satisfying mental states.
Even a cheerful Tiny Tim, we think, suffers misfortune. But it is not
objectionable that the priority view holds that the special reason to aid a
person that stems from the fact that she suffers a disability may be
outweighed by other factors that render it the case that she is overall
enjoying a good quality of life compared to others. Moreover, we must
be careful to distinguish judgments made at the level of ideal theory with
full information and judgments about public policy here and now, that
must be made with limited information in nonideal circumstances. A
law that provides for governmental assistance to the needy must identify
the needy recipients of aid by markers that are reasonably easy to
identify and verify, and costly to fake. Hence a sensible law that was
warranted by prioritarian principle would provide aid in some
circumstances where an agent with full information would deny it and
deny aid in some circumstances in which an agent with full information
would provide it. (So some Tiny Tims would merit aid by the terms of a
sensible legal policy or social practice but not by the terms of ideal
moral principle.)
The authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice might
object that this Essay’s discussion of what to do about people with
disabilities makes exactly the error they are concerned to correct.32 They
might argue that I have slipped into writing as though the problem was
simply one of fairly dividing the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation. However, the morality of inclusion is focused on a prior
and more fundamental issue—how to design the framework for social
cooperation so that it is adequately inclusive.
The objection misfires. Fairly dividing the benefits and burdens of
social cooperation requires envisaging alternative schemes of cooperation
that might produce greater benefits or a more fair division. What the
authors regard as the problem of inclusion is an aspect of the fair
division problem, rather than an analytically distinct issue. In given
circumstances the priority view might require small adjustments at the
32. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 303 (one of several passages that
suggest they would make this objection).
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margins of the existing scheme of cooperation (for example, altering the
eligibility requirements for food stamps), but in other circumstances it
might require wholesale transformation (for example, moving from a
socialist to a free market capitalist economy or the reverse).
Moreover, there is something unsatisfactory about framing the issue as
the extent to which we should widen the dominant scheme of
cooperation. This language tends to convey the impression that we face
one large decision—the choice of a dominant scheme. But however
exactly one demarcates the dominant framework from the rest, the fact is
that the effects of the operation of the dominant framework can be
modified by adjustment of nondominant aspects of the cooperative
scheme. The underlying issue is what adjustments to the status quo,
large or small, can be made at what cost in order to achieve what level of
gain for what number of individuals at what prior well-being level. How
does focusing on the dominant scheme of cooperation33 help determine
what policy choices should be made?
These decisions to include or exclude, whether made explicitly or by
inattention, will typically be piecemeal. One may decide that the benefit
if any to severely retarded persons that would accrue to them from
guaranteeing them the franchise and gearing political debate to their
level of comprehension is outweighed by the resultant lowering of the
expectable quality of democratic decisionmaking, so this form of
inclusion should not be implemented. Other forms of inclusion may be
more cost-effective when judged by the proper moral standard. For
example, regulation and taxation of business firms to stimulate the
provision of paid employment to severely retarded persons might prove
to be a morally required form of inclusion according to prioritarian
principle. By contrast, some forms of severe mental illness that tend to
make people disruptive in social settings requiring complex coordination
of tasks, but do not make people less able than others, on the average, to
vote wisely (should they choose to vote at all) might prompt the reverse
judgments—inclusion of people with these forms of mental illness by
way of extension of the political franchise but no special attempts to
include them in the workplace.
A careful reader might well complain that the argument that
prioritarianism satisfactorily addresses the problem of inclusion is
entirely unfounded. Prioritarianism as characterized here is a family of
33.

Id. at 288–91.
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moral principles. To determine a specific principle that would yield
definite implications for policy, one would have to specify a particular
weighting. To what degree exactly does the lifetime level of well-being
a person would have, absent some benefit, raise or lower the value of
getting the benefit for that person? I do not claim to know the answer.
But then surely this Essay’s assertion that prioritarianism resolves the
conflict of claims that generates the problem of inclusion is a sham.
This objection has some force. However, viewing the problem
through a prioritarian lens sharpens our understanding. The weighting
problem that we must resolve to get determinate policy implications is
exactly the problem we do need to solve to arrive at sound principle. In
particular, the prioritarian position is that the terms in which the interests
at stake should be balanced should be cast in terms of people’s wellbeing levels. The right policy choice depends on its long term impact on
the actual quality of people’s lives. Finally, one can say something
vague but nontrivial toward a solution of the weighting problem. At one
extreme, a prioritarianism that gives almost no extra weight to wellbeing gains that accrue to those with low well-being collapses into a
version of straightforward aggregate utilitarianism. This position is too
extreme. At the other extreme, a prioritarianism that gives infinite extra
weight to providing a benefit of any size to someone whose well-being
level is just slightly lower than the well-being level of alternative
recipients of the benefit collapses into leximin. This position is too
extreme. One should espouse a “Goldilocks principle” that assigns a
weighting in the middle range and splits the difference between these
extremes.
In an interesting discussion, the authors tentatively suggested a moral
balancing of interests different from what the priority view as modified
above recommends.34 They suggested that morality might require as a
first priority, bringing as many individuals as possible to a threshold
level of participation in the cooperative framework, a level that is good
enough. Above that level, the moral concern to promote inclusion
legitimately has less weight, compared to the concern to make
cooperative schemes maximally productive.
The authors made this suggestion in an exploratory spirit without
committing themselves to it. It might still be worth noting that this
suggestion is inadequate, and the inadequacy points toward the priority
view. First, one surely does not want to assign strict priority to boosting
those who are below the threshold over bringing about benefit for those
who are already above the threshold. Some individuals might have traits
that render boosting them to the threshold extremely costly. Some
34.
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individuals will inevitably remain below threshold, but vast expenditures
of resources would move them just slightly closer to it. In some
circumstances, very small expenditures of resources would provide
great benefit for those already above threshold, and, in some cases, for
those barely above threshold. Whether one understands the authors as
recommending (a) giving strict priority to bringing as many individuals
as possible to the threshold, or rather (b) giving strict priority to bringing
about gains for those who are below the threshold (whether or not they
can be brought to it), the recommendation should be rejected, because
for any individual, no matter how badly off she is, if the cost to other
better-off people of bringing about a small benefit to her becomes larger
and larger, at some point, the priority should switch to helping the
others. Second, one cannot identify nonarbitrarily a threshold level of
participation in cooperative schemes, bringing people to which has
special moral value. There is no such threshold. There is rather a
continuum of well-being levels, from hell to heaven as it were, and for
any individual, it is better to be closer to the heavenly end of the scale.
V. FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
In chapters 3 and 4, the authors considered how best to interpret the
ideal of equality of opportunity, regarded as a fundamental justice norm
that inter alia determines what we owe one another by way of medical
care provision.35 The authors opted for a Rawlsian conception of
equality of opportunity as modified by Norman Daniels’s suggestion that
fundamental moral rights to medical care should be included within the
requirements of Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity.36 The authors
defended this Rawls-Daniels approach to equality of opportunity against
more expansive and demanding conceptions and urged that it provides a
sound framework for exploring the moral ramifications of new genetic
technologies.37 To evaluate these claims, some stage setting is needed.
The Rawlsian principle that the authors at least tentatively embraced
holds that social and economic inequalities must be (a) attached to
positions and offices open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and
(b) to the maximal long run benefit of the least advantaged members of

35.
36.
37.

Id. at 65–86, 108–49.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 108–49.
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society.38 Fair equality of opportunity obtains when all persons with the
same native talent and the same ambition have the same prospects for
success in competitions for positions that yield above-average shares of
social and economic goods.39 In this principle (a) has strict priority over
(b), so that no inequalities are permitted, even if they would work to
optimize the prospects of the least advantaged, unless the fair equality of
opportunity norm is satisfied.40 In the application of this principle,
social and economic benefits are measured in terms of primary social
goods (other than basic constitutional liberties).41
Norman Daniels proposed to include health care within the fair
equality of opportunity principle.42 In any given arrangement of society,
with fair equality of opportunity otherwise provided, the native traits of
an individual afford her access to a certain share of the array of
reasonable life plans people can choose in the society (including a
certain level of expected success in competitions for positions of
advantage).43 Ill health and the lingering effects of chronic and episodic
disease and injury deprive an individual of her share of this normal
opportunity range, to which she has an entitlement.44 Health care
provision aims to restore individuals to their shares of the normal
opportunity range so far as this is feasible.45 Fair equality of opportunity
extended to include health care holds that this must be done as a matter
of justice. Extended fair equality of opportunity then, is not obtained
unless persons with the same native talent and same ambition have the
same prospects for competitive success, despite any differences among
them in their health history and in their susceptibilities to injury and
disease (within constraints of feasibility).46
This position has its attractions, but its chief weakness is that it gives a
special and arbitrary priority to making sure that all individuals with the
same native talents have the same prospects for success in competitions
for advantage, come what may. The position need not suppose that
talents are metaphysically set. Whether a given trait an individual is
born with counts as a talent or not depends on the contingencies of
the given social and natural environment. Suppose, however, that the
meshing of individual traits and environment in a given society brings it
about that one person is talented and susceptible to disease and another
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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is untalented and not susceptible to disease. Why suppose that it is a
special requirement of justice that the bad effects on the individual’s life
of susceptibility to disease are to be blocked as far as is possible so that
the talented individual enjoys the identical share of the normal range of
opportunity that goes to all other equally talented and ambitious
individuals? The special entitlement linked to possession of native talent
on this approach embeds a meritocratic element at the core of the
principles of justice.
This summary judgment might be resisted on the ground that fair
equality of opportunity must be assessed as it interacts with the other
principles in the Rawlsian system, and especially the difference
principle.47 The competitions that assign positions of advantage are to
be set so that they work to the long term maximal benefit of the least
advantaged citizens. Moreover, if fair equality of opportunity is not
fulfilled, the response required by Rawlsian theory is enforcement of
equal distribution of social and economic benefits, not class privileges
for the talented.48
But something is amiss. One way to see this is to notice that fair
equality of opportunity might be a strongly binding constraint on the
pursuit of the amelioration of the lot of the least advantaged. In
situations where inequalities could be instituted that would violate fair
equality of opportunity and work to the significant benefit of the least
advantaged, doing this is forbidden by Rawlsian justice.49 This
conclusion is counterintuitive unless fair equality of opportunity itself
commands our strong allegiance. The words “equality of opportunity”
conjure images of denial of equal opportunity by horrible practices of
arbitrary exclusion such as Jim Crow laws or a regime in which all good
jobs are reserved for men only. But the Rawlsian principle extends
equality of opportunity requirements far beyond these types of cases,
47. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 127–28.
48. The claims in the two preceding sentences in the text are straightforward
implications of Rawls’s second principle of justice, that includes the equality of fair
opportunity and difference principle components, along with a priority rule linking them.
See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 266–67.
49. According to Rawls, an inequality in social and economic benefits is
permissible only if it is attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of
equality of fair opportunity. For example, if allowing employers to hire and fire at will
increased economic production and hence (via redistributive taxation) the share of
benefits going to the worst off, but resulted in discriminatory patterns of employment,
Rawls’s principle with its priority rule would forbid this grant of discretion to employers.
See id.
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and the Daniels expansion of the principle extends them even further.
Suppose a wealthy, charming, intelligent youth has a chronic mild disease
condition that is very difficult and expensive to treat. Contrary to
extended fair equality of opportunity, justice does not require as a matter
of special priority that health care resources be channeled to the well off
but not healthy youth without regard for the cost of such provision on
the well-being opportunities of the worst off.
Several issues are joined here. They need to be disentangled. One
issue is whether health care is morally special as compared to a wide
range of social provisions that might improve the quality of people’s
lives. Another is whether social and economic justice requires equal
provision of any sort, whether equal opportunity or equal something else.
Yet another is whether the different elements in a theory of justice can
plausibly be ordered by way of Rawls’s strict lexical priority relations.
Finally, there is the issue of whether, at the level of fundamental moral
theory, distributive justice should take resources (in particular, primary
social goods), or instead the quality of life that provision of resources
affords, as the standard of interpersonal comparison. These are large
issues, which this brief Essay cannot settle.
This Essay briefly indicates what is problematic about the RawlsDaniels resolution of these issues. Consider again the extremely talented
person, leading a great life, who falls victim to accident or disease. We
stipulate the person does not command a large share of material
resources, primary social goods such as income and wealth. She uses
her talents informally, outside the market, a way that is congenial to her.
Suppose resources are limited, and society can choose to cure this
overall fortunate individual’s medical condition, restoring her to normal
species functioning, or install a public park in a neighborhood where
people who are in the pink of health but leading lives of very low quality
reside. What determines whether priority should attach to bringing
about benefits for the sick but fortunate individual or for others depends
on the overall lifetime well-being level each affected person would
reach, absent our contemplated policy intervention. In the example,
contrary to the Rawls-Daniels theory, priority should go to helping the
worse off, though what should be done depends also on the amount of
benefit that the worse off and better off would gain from alternative
policies. Neither people’s resource shares nor an amalgam of resource
shares plus health conditions registers what we must know in order to
determine who is truly needy and deserving of extra aid. Moreover,
neither establishing equality of condition nor maximizing the resource
level of the worst off subject to equal opportunity constraints, is what
fundamentally matters from a moral standpoint. In a nutshell, what
matters morally is priority for the badly off, not equality or maximin.
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The measure of how well off or badly off one is should be well-being,
not resources (and not resources adjusted for health status either).
In chapter 4 the authors presented an apparent counterexample to the
Rawls-Daniels extended account of fair equality of opportunity as
applied to health care provision.50 This account draws a sharp moral
distinction between conditions of disease and disability that detract from
the individual’s share of the normal opportunity range that is set by the
individual’s native talent and conditions that are not health care
problems in this sense but could be ameliorated by medical treatment.51
The former conditions prima facie deprive the individual of fair equality
of opportunity. Justice requires that the conditions be ameliorated if that
is medically feasible. The latter conditions do not in this way trigger fair
equality of opportunity requirements. Hence, a child whose disease
condition, if untreated, will lower her expected adult height is owed
medical treatment according to the Rawls-Daniels approach, but a child
whose normal genetic disposition gives her the identical expected adult
height and could be ameliorated by medical treatment just as costeffectively is not owed medical treatment under the Rawls-Daniels
approach.
The weaknesses the counterexample exposes are debilitating. What is
special about health care needs is that bad health threatens well-being.
But at the level of fundamental moral theory, nothing gives health care
needs a moral priority over anything else that is needed for well-being.
What we owe one another is a decent chance at living a good life, and
anything and everything that improve the odds or boost the expected
well-being that people can attain are morally on a par. Saying this is, of
course, compatible with choosing social and legal policy, which must be
coarse grained,52 on the basis of distinctions that roughly track what
ultimately matters from the moral standpoint. Again, for the prioritarian,
the right coarse-grained distinctions are those that produce the morally
best outcomes for people.
50. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 115–16.
51. Id.
52. A policy is coarse grained if it prescribes that actions should not vary in
response to variations in some morally relevant feature of the situation in which action is
to occur. For example, a welfare state policy of aid to the needy is coarse grained if it
provides that all people with demonstrated low income should get the same aid
regardless of how they came to have low income. A policy should be coarse grained if
making the policy finer grained produces worse results as evaluated by fundamental
moral theory.
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The authors oddly introduced considerations of efficiency in support
of the Rawls-Daniels theory of equality of opportunity. They did so by
contrasting this relatively restricted conception of equality of opportunity
with other more expansive conceptions that do not take the natural
distribution of native talent as a baseline, but rather require that all
persons should have equal initial opportunity to achieve the good life.
This is what the authors called the brute luck conception of equality of
opportunity.53 Within this paradigm, opportunity is understood such that
if one has an opportunity for X, then chooses X and tries to get it, one
gets it. These more expansive conceptions of equal opportunity require
that all factors that affect a person’s prospects for the good life, should
they choose seriously to pursue it, must be offset or adjusted so that no
factors beyond the individual’s control give her lesser prospects than
anyone else enjoys. The authors sensibly responded that any such
expansive conception of equal opportunity, if fully implemented, would
be enormously expensive in terms of other values and might well leave
everyone worse off than they would be if this expansive conception were
not implemented.54
But there are distinct questions here that need to be kept straight. One
question is how best to interpret the ideal of equality—either as equality
of outcome or equality of opportunity. A quite different question is what
relative moral importance to assign to equality when it conflicts with
other moral values. The authors argued against the brute luck
conception of equality of opportunity on the ground that it is implausible
to suppose that this ideal of equality trumps all other moral values. But
it may well be the case that the best conception of equality should not
trump all other moral values, so this consideration is misplaced if
directed as an objection against any proposed interpretation of equality.
Matters are yet more complex in ways that undermine the authors’
dismissal of the brute luck conception of distributive justice. This
conception, broadly understood, holds that what we owe one another by
way of justice obligations is to prevent or alleviate misfortune, but in
each case the extent of our obligation varies depending on the degree to
which the misfortune we are considering is due to sheer brute luck or is
mediated by the individual’s voluntary choice or negligence that might
have prevented the condition.55 For example, we might owe more to
Smith, who is badly off because a foreign invasion he could not have
foreseen devastated his life, than to Jones, who is badly off because he
53. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 66–73.
54. The authors emphasized that principles of justice must integrate concerns for
equality, liberty, and efficiency rather than go whole hog for equality. Id. at 127–28; see
also id. at 132–33.
55. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 73.
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failed to utilize attractive opportunities and instead chose to dabble in
recreational drugs that proved destructive, even if the same infusion of
aid would do just as much for Jones as for Smith and have no further
consequences. It is obvious that the idea that the distinction between
brute luck and option luck should matter for distributive justice—the
idea that what we owe to needy individuals depends on their degree of
personal responsibility for their plight—is entirely independent of the
idea that distributive justice bids us to pursue equality or some other
goal. This Essay posits that the distinction between brute luck and option
luck should register significantly in the formulation of fundamental
moral principles. This view might be right or wrong. It is not impugned
by the claim that the goal of equalizing people’s condition does not
trump all other moral values, nor even by the claim that this sort of
equalizing has no moral value per se at all.
The authors linked this disagreement between expansive and restricted
conceptions of equal opportunity with an issue concerning the scope of
justice obligations.56 Does distributive justice, in its role of catering to
the disadvantaged, require compensation for natural disadvantage, such
as being born with low intelligence, or require only compensation or
elimination of socially constructed disadvantage? The Rawlsian response,
toward which the authors incline, is complex. On the one hand, equal
opportunity in the fair equality version requires only that those with the
same talents and ambitions should have the same competitive prospects.
On the other hand, the social mechanisms that confer unequal shares of
primary social goods other than basic liberty must be set so that the long
term primary goods expectations of the least favored social group are
maximized. The authors added the interesting observation that the line
between what is naturally given and what is socially constructed shifts
with new genetic technologies, because technologies give us the power
to determine with increasing precision exactly what genetic
predisposition to traits any newborn individual will possess.57
The comparison of restricted and expansive conceptions of equality of
opportunity is itself too restricted to facilitate clear judgments about the
major issues raised by the Rawls-Daniels approach to equal opportunity.
The discussion in this Part attempts to explain how this is so.
As already noted, the comparison of two rival interpretations of equal
56.
57.

BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 75–77, 109, 126–41.
Id. at 82–84.
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opportunity leaves undiscussed the issue of whether any sort of equal
distribution of opportunity is a fundamental justice requirement. On the
prioritarian view, everyone’s having the same is not intrinsically morally
desirable.58
Once the scope issue is separated from the equality issue, there is
much to be said for wide scope as interpreted by prioritarianism. On this
view, our obligation to assist an individual depends on what well-being
gain we can achieve for her at what cost (measured by the standard of
prioritarian values) and on what her well-being expectation is prior to
receipt of this benefit. If an individual is badly off and can be aided at
reasonable cost, whether her disadvantage is socially or naturally caused
does not affect impediments to well-being and, in this respect, are
morally on a par. Disadvantage is disadvantage.

58.
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